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I. INTRODUCTION
The peremptory challenge1 has served a key role in the striking of
1. The peremptory challenge is essentially the attorney's tool in striking jurors for reasons
that would not necessarily indicate bias, but often are based on hunches or "gut feelings" that a
particular juror would not be fit to serve. See R. Stuart Phillips, Without Cause: The Case for
Abolishing the Peremptory Challenge in the Wake of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 31
BEVERLY HILLS B. Ass'N J. 47, 47 (1996).
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partially, perceivably, or actually biased jurors2 from serving on jury
panels. Original rationales for the use of the peremptory challenge3
appeared to protect the litigants from jurors perceived to be unfair, for
whatever reason,4 to be seated in judgment of a case. Often, their chal-
lenges were based upon the race of the parties, the nature of the case, or
the particular claims.5
Early Supreme Court cases addressing the use of peremptory chal-
lenges demanded that such peremptory strikes6 create and maintain a
certain minimum level of race-neutrality 7 in their application. Eventu-
ally, the Supreme Court decisions in Batson v. Kentucky8 and Georgia v.
McCollum 9 provided a constitutional basis' ° for the use of such strikes.
2. Jurors may also be stricken "for cause" during the voir dire process, where any potential
juror may be stricken for exhibiting a "specific bias which threatens the jury's impartiality."
Stacey L. Wichterman, Note, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Gender-Based Peremptory
Challenges on Trial, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 209, 212 (1995).
3. Early courts focused on the ability of each defendant to receive a fair trial by being
granted the right to be tried by a jury that was not selected by discriminatory means. See Sheri
Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 21, 24 (1993) (focusing on Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
4. "Indeed, evaluating people on the basis of stereotypes is an inherent aspect of the
peremptory challenge system." Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned
About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 447 (1996).
5. Recently, these particular "reasons" for peremptory juror exclusion were illuminated in
the O.J. Simpson criminal case. Based upon pretrial research, it was determined that black women
would be the most harmful jurors for the prosecution's case. Black women, as a "group," were
polled, and were thought to believe that Simpson was not guilty by a three to one margin over
black men. Black men, in turn, were thought to believe that Simpson was not guilty by almost a
three to one margin over whites. See William F. Fahey, Peremptory Challenges, FED. LAW., Oct.
1992, at 30, 32 (citing the work of DecisionQuest of Torrance, California, the polling group).
6. The terms "challenge" and "strike" will be used interchangeably throughout this Note.
7. Yet, it was nearly impossible until the 1980's for one party to prove that the other had
purposely discriminated in its use of peremptory challenges. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965). Although the Swain Court recognized the important right of peremptory challenge, it
noted that "a defendant in a criminal case is not constitutionally entitled to demand a proportionate
number of his race on the jury which tries him nor on the venire or jury roll from which petit
jurors are drawn." Id. at 208. Additionally, the Court placed a heavy burden on the party
opposing the strike in proving purposeful discrimination. "We cannot say that purposeful
discrimination based on race alone is satisfactorily proved by showing that an identifiable group in
a community is underrepresented by as much as 10%." Id. at 208-09 (emphasis added).
8. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
9. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
10. "In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges against individual jurors on
the basis of race." Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory
Challenges that Violate a Prospective Juror's Speech and Association Rights, 24 HOFsm A L.
REv. 567, 578 (1996) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 84). The juror's right to serve was protected in
McCollum, as the state objected to the criminal defendant's discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges. There, the Court held that "a criminal defendant exercising a peremptory challenge
possesses no greater right to discriminate invidiously against prospective jurors on the basis of
race than does a prosecutor or civil litigant." Id. at 581 (citing McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57-59).
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The Court aimed primarily toward protecting the jurors and litigants
from the "evil" of purposeful discrimination 1 in the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges.' 2
Since the Supreme Court handed down the aforementioned deci-
sions concerning the nondiscriminatory use of the peremptory challenge,
many legal authors signaled its collapse as a method of eliminating
potential jurors from the panel. 13  Attorneys could no longer excuse
jurors without minimally adducing "clear and reasonably specific"' 4
race-neutral explanations for the elimination of particular jurors. Addi-
tionally, lawyers had to clear the hurdle' 5 of showing that their reasons
for challenging particular jurors were "related to the particular case to be
tried."' 6  Consequently, the full peremptory nature of the challenge
seemed to have been eroded by the Court's insistence on protecting the
jurors' equal protection rights.
This Note, however, will attempt to illustrate that rather than dying,
the peremptory challenge has actually survived to undermine the intent
of the Batson Court. In fact, the skilled advocate can simply employ
innovative questioning or investigative techniques to support a race-neu-
tral juror excusal. 17 Hence, discriminatory practices in juror challenges
still exist, as the savvy attorney need only articulate a race-neutral expla-
nation for his or her actions in striking a particular juror."8
11. See Melilli, supra note 4, at 449 ("The word 'discrimination' is defined as 'the making or
perceiving of a distinction or difference.' The word is qualitatively neutral. Thus, the entire
process of jury selection is one of discrimination. The real issue is whether the criteria upon
which the discriminations are based are reasonable and acceptable.") (emphasis added; footnotes
omitted).
12. This Note will focus primarily on the racially motivated uses of the peremptory challenge,
although courts have dealt with similar issues of peremptory challenges based wholly or partially
on gender, ethnicity, religion, and other potentially class-distinguishing characteristics.
13. See generally Jason Hochberg, Peremptory Challenge: An American Relic-Like the
Model-T Ford and the $2 Bill, Its Time Has Passed, CRin. JUST., Winter 1996. Hochberg states
that "[tlhe logical and practical effects of the Court's decisions on the constitutionality of the
peremptory challenge foreshadow its certain demise." Id. at 10.
14. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 258 (1981)).
15. However, "the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a
challenge for cause." Id. at 97.
16. Id. at 98. The reader will note, however, that "[i]t is the role of the trial court to assess the
race-neutral explanation proffered by the prosecution and to determine whether it is pretextual or
sincere." Bader, supra note 10, at 579 (citing Batson, id. at 98).
17. The reader will note that the litigator need only arrive at one valid race-neutral
articulation in order to support a juror excusal. This task would appear quite simple in light of the
tools available to the able counselor, such as "ranking scales, community attitudinal surveys ...
juror investigations.... focus groups, mock trials, . . . and even psychics." Jim Goodwin, Note,
Articulating the Inarticulable: Relying on Nonverbal Behavioral Cues to Deception to Strike
Jurors During Voir Dire, 38 Aiuz. L. REv. 739, 750 (1996) (footnote omitted).
18. See supra notes 14, 16, and accompanying text.
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The Court's opinion in Batson was intended to give the individual
juror the right to not be excluded from service through discriminatory
efforts by counsel. 9 Additionally, Batson's intent, at least in part, was
to ensure that each party be tried by a jury of his or her peers.2 0 Yet in
its ongoing process of formulating the "steps"2 to achieve this high-
minded goal, the Court has given little, if any, guidance to trial judges in
evaluating the validity of these race-neutral "reasons. '"22
In both federal and state court proceedings, judges have struggled
with the application of the Batson standard,23 and this author will argue
that it is one which appears to be unworkable in practice. Recently, in
Purkett v. Elem,24 the Supreme Court again attempted to guide litigators
toward a more efficient standard of requiring a "facially neutral" 25 rea-
son for juror excusal. The Court decided, however, that the only issue a
judge must determine when an attorney proffers a reason for the striking
of the potential juror is its mere "facial validity. 26
As the dissent in Purkett points out,2 7 this analysis creates a situa-
tion in which a talented lawyer will now be able to effectively circum-
vent Batson's intent. He or she can still rely on a "hunch" rationale28 to
19. The Court in Batson used several rationales in its disdain of the discriminatory strikes
against potential jurors. The Court focused on the harm to the individual juror's right to serve, as
well as the harm to the entire community by undermining the integrity of the judicial system as a
whole. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 32.
20. Obviously, "[t]he jury trial is fundamental to our nation's system of justice." Bader,
supra note 10, at 572 (footnote omitted).
21. See infra Part Ill.E.
22. See infra Part II.F-G.
23. Although Batson ostensibly guides the Court in determining whether a particular strike
was exercised discriminatorily, trial judges have noted difficulty in its application. "One of the
criticisms of Batson, which poses particularly acute difficulties for trial judges, is the problem of
detecting pretextual explanations that mask race- or gender-motivated peremptory exclusions."
Christopher E. Smith & Roxanne Ochoa, The Peremptory Challenge in the Eyes of the Trial
Judge, 79 JUDICATURE 185, 185 (1996).
24. 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995).
25. "[T]he issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory
intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered [to strike the potential juror]
will be deemed race neutral." Id. at 1771 (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360
(1991)).
26. Id. The Court in Purkett emphasized this point further when it proclaimed that at this step
of the process (the articulation of a race-neutral reason for striking the potential juror), the striking
attorney need not even advance a plausible or persuasive reason. The court's role is solely to
analyze if the reason is race-neutral on its face, not whether the court is indeed convinced that the
reason is race-neutral. See id.
27. "Today, without argument, the Court replaces the Batson standard with the surprising
announcement that any neutral explanation, no matter how 'implausible or fantastic,' ... even if it
is 'silly or superstitious,' . . . is sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination." Id. at
1774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. Justice Stevens points out the simple irony of the Court forcing the advocate to articulate
a race-neutral reason for the strike. He notes that "[t]he Court does not attempt to explain why a
statement that 'the juror had a beard,' or 'the juror's name began with the letter 'S" should satisfy
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excuse jurors, an intuition that was basically permitted before the Batson
decision. Essentially, the lawyer may use any reason to strike a juror as
long as it does not implicate an impermissible group bias.29
Now, the able attorney will simply be able to use non-racial,
facially "legitimate" reasons to survive any attacks on his or her use of
the peremptory challenge. Even if the true underlying reason for the
strike is indeed pretextual, all the counselor need do is articulate a rea-
son to the judge which appears facially neutral. As a consequence, this
"loophole" provides the attorney with the incentive to continue with
lengthy questioning of potential jurors.
As the attorney elicits more and more personal facts and views
from each potential juror, he or she will inevitably find a "race-neutral"
reason to proffer before the judge as grounds for juror excusal. Hence,
the trained attorney now knows exactly how to excuse potential jurors,
while trial judges are still having difficulty evaluating the legitimate use
of peremptory challenges.30 Hence, the current state of the peremptory
challenge is in jeopardy.
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court doctrines concerning the
developing use of peremptory challenges, and their legitimate applica-
tions. In Part II, I discuss the historical and traditional rationales for
maintaining the peremptory challenge. Focus is placed on individual
and group rights that are theorized to be protected by the continual
evolution of the peremptory challenge. Additionally, I illustrate the
potential trauma that may come to pass with the continued application of
the peremptory challenge in its current form.
Part II analyzes two major Supreme Court pronouncements on the
use of the peremptory challenge, namely Batson and McCollum. Addi-
step two [the articulation of the race-neutral reason for the strike], though a statement that 'I had a
hunch' should not." id.
29. Id. The reader should note the unfortunate effect of Batson and Purkett. Both cases
ostensibly attempted to eliminate race as a determinant in exercising peremptory strikes, in order
to secure the juror's constitutional rights against equal protection violations. Additionally, both
Courts still revered the integrity of the peremptory challenge as a means of providing the litigant
and the judiciary itself with a fair trial by a jury of peers.
Despite this intent, "[a] juror's 'hostility' also has been accepted as a race-neutral
explanation. Jurors may be excused based on 'hunches,' and even arbitrary exclusion is
permissible, so long as the reasons are not based on impermissible group bias." CATHY E.
BENNETT & ROBERT B. HIRSCHHORN, BENNETT's GUIDE TO JURY SELECTION AND TRIAL
DYNAmics IN CIvIL AND CRIMINAL LmGATION 334 (Eda Gordon ed., Supp. 1995).
It appears that the Court has certainly taken a giant step toward eliminating discriminatory
reasons for juror excusal. Evidently, though, the Court has not yet dealt with the other evasive
race-neutral reasons that can be given to discriminate against jurors indirectly.
30. "Batson and its progeny have proven less an obstacle to discrimination than a road map to
it. Parties now have a good idea of what they can and cannot get away with in eliminating jurors
and adjust their means to suit their desired end." Smith and Ochoa, supra note 23, at 185
(footnote omitted).
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tionally, I analyze the essential qualities of the "burden-shifting" steps
which must be rebutted to maintain a claim of purposeful discrimination
in juror strikes. These "steps" focus primarily on the form of the reasons
articulated in challenging an allegedly discriminatory peremptory strike,
and not necessarily on their substantive validity.
Furthermore, I suggest that the standard expressed in Purkett-that
of articulating a facially neutral reason, but not necessarily a plausible
one to the court at step two of the analysis-is an unworkable one in
practice. Not only do judges and attorneys have difficulty understanding
this race-neutral analysis, but the method itself may be inherently
flawed. Judicial integrity, the rights of jurors to serve, and those of liti-
gants to have some freedom in having their peers sit in judgment over
them, have been impaired by the Supreme Court's insistence on the form
of the challenge, and not on its substance. Additionally, in Part III, I
focus on Purkett in detail and analyze its implications for the future.
Part IV of this Note analyzes the history of one state, Florida, as a
paradigmatic example of the continued difficulty in the reformulation
and application of the "steps" to be used in challenging allegedly dis-
criminatory peremptory strikes. I argue that Florida, in an attempt to
follow Supreme Court doctrine on the issue of peremptory challenges,
has impinged, albeit unintentionally, on the rights of jurors and of those
accused. In Part V of this Note, I expand this analysis by illustrating
problems other states and courts are having in applying the Batson and
Purkett pronouncements.
Finally, Part VI suggests some different implications for the future
of the peremptory challenge. Many scholars have called for the end of
the peremptory challenge, and these views have real merit. According
to these proposals, the courts would simply abolish the peremptory chal-
lenge because it has now apparently become a ruse for unlawful and
discriminatory juror excusal.
Nevertheless, there may be more meaningful alternatives available
to abolition, by retaining the peremptory excusal, yet modifying it into a
type of "quasi-cause" or "semi-cause" challenge. This preferred method
can be achieved by granting jurors more rights in challenging their own
excusals, perhaps allowing them to rebut the reason given for the per-
emptory strike. Alternatively, courts can truly re-establish the "peremp-
tory" nature of the challenge by expanding the grounds for cause
challenges to include perceptions of bias. These "perceptions" would be
based on information elicited from the juror in light of the issues in the
trial. This method would expand the grounds for cause challenges and
address issues of bias, thereby allowing for unimpeded use of purely
peremptory strikes. Either method would abolish the peremptory chal-
[Vol. 52:635
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lenge as it currently exists. This is vital for its use and plausibility must
currently meet undesirably minimal standards of fairness and judicial
legitimacy.
II. TRADMONAL BASES FOR THE IMPOSITION OF THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE-WHOSE RIGHTS ARE BEING PROTECTED?
A. Juror Protection
The juror is best viewed as the common citizen helping the judicial
system by cooperating in the democratic process. In a very real sense,
though, the potential juror, in many instances, has been pushed around
the courthouse all day. This individual has likely been hurried from
room to room, has been questioned all day, and has been treated like
somewhat of a victim in the judicial process. Therefore, it is obvious
that his or her exclusion may be accompanied by feelings that the juror
did not have the ability to have his or her voice heard, or to make a
difference in determining the outcome of a case involving a peer.31
Additionally, when the juror is excused through discriminatory means,
such a pardon may even infringe on the individual's constitutional
rights.32 In fact, by striking the juror on the basis of race, the juror's
equal protection rights may be violated without any evidence by the
attorney that such group status would bear negatively on the case at
bar.33 To serve the ends of justice, the use of the peremptory challenge
should at least meet the juror's basic privilege to either serve on the jury,
or to be stricken through nondiscriminatory means. These appear to be
the only two constitutionally sound alternatives available to the courts.
B. Party Protection-History and Facts of the Case
In many instances, especially in the criminal context, the challeng-
ing party itself has a strong interest in determining the jury composition.
In particular, the criminal defendant often has a real stake in assuring a
31. In fact, juror selection has become a modem business, and individuals are stricken for not
fitting the "ideal juror" profile on a given case. Such determinations are often made on the basis
of occupation, appearance, and even facial features. See Wichterman, supra note 2, at 235.
32. See Bader, supra note 10, at 598-99. Bader notes that "by allowing speech and affiliation
to be utilized as a basis for juror exclusion, a court is implicitly stating that a litigant's desire to
influence the jury composition is more important than a juror's First Amendment freedoms." Id.
at 599.
33. One scholar has even noted that there are equal protection harms implicit in
discriminatory juror excusal. Nevertheless, "[flor all of the Court's heated rhetoric about the evils
of discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges, the Court has firmly rejected the idea
that a juror's race.., has any bearing on how that juror will view the evidence in a case or vote on
the question of guilt or innocence." Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error,
Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 96 (1996).
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fair composition of those seated in judgment of the case.34 Yet, many
decisions concerning the use of peremptory challenges inevitably turn
on the history of discrimination against a particular group, or on the
facts of the case itself.
First of all, early rationales for the imposition of the peremptory
challenge were primarily based on the protection of the individual
party.35 Of course, litigants in actions have certain constitutional rights,
for instance, the right to receive a trial by a jury of one's peers.36 Addi-
tionally, litigants may even have a certain intrinsic right to be tried by a
fair "representative" panel of potential jurors.37
Consequently, many litigants, due to racial reasons, find it patently
unfair to be tried by certain racially combined groups of jurors. 38  The
history of discrimination against certain classes, or in certain parts of
this country, cannot be ignored.39 Whether fair in its application, the
peremptory challenge can still be an effective tool for the litigant to con-
trol the composition of the jury.4" This holds true especially when there
is evidence of potentially discriminatory pools of jurors. In many cases,
34. To take this proposition to its logical extreme, one need only imagine the prosecution of a
Skinhead for allegedly lynching an African-American. In this instance, the litigant may not be
able to receive a fair trial if not allowed peremptory challenges, perhaps even those based on
perceptions of group bias.
35. See Melilli, supra note 4, at 452-53 (noting that prior to Batson, the primary purpose of
peremptory challenges had always been viewed as one of protecting litigants' rights). He notes
that, "lawyers, of course, seek not an impartial jury, but rather jurors most favorable to their
client's interests. As long as the validity of peremptory challenges was measured by the primary
directive of protecting litigants' interests, nondiscriminatory jury selection could never be a
realistic consideration." Id. at 453 (footnotes omitted).
36. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ...
[and] to be confronted with the witnesses against him ... and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. Basically:
[Vlenire selection law comes close to assuring the defendant a "representative"
venire .... [Tihe Court has been adamant that no defendant has a right to a jury of
any particular composition.... [H]owever, venire selection requirements produce a
venire likely to contain a significant number of jurors who are not biased against
them.
Johnson, supra note 3, at 26 (footnote omitted).
38. This creates the paradox where an individual must be tried by a jury of his peers, but
when striking jurors, must ignore their group membership and strive for a "fair" jury. See Fahey,
supra note 5, at 31.
39. In fact, the Court's focus on defendants' rights in receiving trials by juries which were
racially "fair" led to changes in burden-shifting in certain areas. For instance, in Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), "the Court held that a showing of the existence of a substantial
number of black citizens in the community, coupled with their total exclusion from jury service,
sufficed to shift to the state the burden of proving that the exclusion did not flow from
discrimination." Johnson, supra note 3, at 25 (citing Norris, 294 U.S. at 594-95, 598).
40. See Bader, supra note 10, at 590. ("Similar to judge-shopping, the peremptory challenge
enables the litigant to manipulate the selection of jurors. Accordingly, restricting a litigant's
DEMISE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
group decisionmaking can serve as a key element in the outcome of a
judicial proceeding, and hence the litigant would naturally have a vested
interest in the selection of that powerful group.
Furthermore, the facts of a particular case may be essential in deter-
mining which jurors to select.41 One need not be a behaviorist or legal
scholar to understand this concept. For instance, eliminating parents
from a jury pool where the defendant is on trial for child molestation
may be a vital consideration in achieving justice. Similarly, a black
defendant, viewed more favorably by his or her own community, might
wish to select from a more racially balanced jury pool.42 Therefore, the
precise nature of the case and its participants also plays a key role in
determining which jurors will be sought to be excluded.
C. Other Compelling Rationales
The rudimentary concept of "peremptory" inheres the barring of a
right of action.43 Nonetheless, the courts appear to continue to expand
the peremptory challenge into a series of questions before the judge as to
its nondiscriminatory use. Has it not then been effectively transposed
into a cause challenge? Alternatively, has not the essential nature of the
"peremptory" challenge been undermined? Litigants can no longer chal-
lenge for "any" reason, which is perhaps a racially sound judicial policy.
Yet it would appear that litigants have lost some basic constitutional
protections in their rights to a fair jury. Consequently, scholars have
long argued that the peremptory challenge is a relic whose time has
passed."
There are compelling rationales for the continued use of the per-
control over the selection of jurors limits her ability to manipulate the selection of the trier of
fact.").
41. Phillips, supra note 1, at 58, suggests that courts adopt a two-pronged approach.
Essentially, each state should ratify its own voir dire questions which would be standardized. Yet,
as this alone would not account for the particularized nature of each case on its own merit,
attorney input should be encouraged in questioning. He argues for counsel submitting additional
relevant questions to the judge, to be read to the jury. See id.
42. See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right
Is It, Anyway? 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 731 (1992). Underwood notes that the defendant not only
has the right to equal protection of the laws, but also has the ability to select jurors biased in his or
her favor. Id. She comments that where a black defendant desires blacks on the jury, "the
exclusion of blacks from the jury on this view deprives the defendant not of the impartial
factfinder to which he is entitled, but of the partial or sympathetic factfinder that every defendant
seeks." Id.
43. The New Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "peremptory" as "barring a right of action
or delay." THE NEW MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICnONARv 541 (1989).
44. See Hochberg, supra note 13, at 52. ("Discrimination, whether based on gender, religion,
race, or social status, denigrates the potential juror and, in turn, casts doubt on the fairness of the
judicial system. As Justice Marshall stated in Batson, '[O]nly by banning peremptories entirely
can such discrimination be ended."') (citing Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
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emptory challenge; many of them are common sense by their very
nature. Should the litigants not have at least some control over the real
or perceived "fairness" of their jury panel? Additionally, the peremp-
tory challenge provides the ability for lawyers to use their "hunches"
and determine the makeup of the jury, without having to articulate any
particular reason for so doing. Does it necessarily follow that in every
situation there need be a colloquy to determine if the strike was racially
motivated? Should it matter?45 In a true sense, peremptories have real
value.
Jurors, litigants, and the judicial integrity of the courts all serve to
benefit from some form of peremptory challenge. Without it, litigants
would be essentially powerless in formulating the jury, unless they could
pass the rigid test of proving juror bias for cause. Jury pools, no matter
how racially imbalanced, would remain unchecked. That system would
inevitably erode popular faith in the jury system, and hence, juries and
courts would appear improperly formed. Therefore, maintaining some
form of peremptory challenge appears desirable in practice.
III. SUPREME COURT PRONOUNCEMENTS
A. Batson
Batson "held that the Equal Protection Clause assures that the State
will not exclude members of the defendant's race from the jury on
account of race and that such conduct also discriminates against the
excluded juror."46 By granting a constitutional protection to jurors, the
Court enhanced the level of race-neutrality by which the peremptory
challenge has to be exercised.47 Additionally, the Batson Court, and
those before it,48 did not demand that the defendant be afforded a jury
constructed solely from members of his or her own race.
Rather, the right addressed in Batson was the defendant's protec-
tion in having members of his or her own race purposely excluded from
service.49 The Court set up a system of "burden-shifting" in proving
45. Seemingly, although popular consensus indicates one belief, particular sets of jurors
exhibit another. For instance, in the O.J. Simpson case, "group-think" and "group-bias" were
prevalent among certain groups of races and classes, which were thought to believe differently
concerning O.J.'s guilt than popular consensus. See Fahey, supra note 5, at 32.
46. Leonard B. Sand, Batson and Jury Selection Revisited, LTIGATION, Summer 1996, at 3
(footnote omitted).
47. See Melilli, supra note 4, at 453 (footnote omitted). ("Batson only makes analytical sense
if one recognizes that it has shifted the primary focus from the rights of the litigants to the rights
of the prospective jurors .... [T]he rights of citizens ...to participate by service on juries,
outweighs the rights of litigants to remove jurors without cause.") (footnote omitted).
48. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (holding that the defendant does not
have the right to a jury made up of his or her own race).
49. See Bader, supra note 10, at 579.
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such purposeful discrimination.5" Batson finally gave voice to jurors'
rights in being peremptorily excluded from service without legitimate,
race-neutral reasons for such removals.
B. McCollum
The Court had occasion to address a number of post-Batson cases
concerning the use of peremptory challenges. In McCollum,51 the Court
was confronted with the scenario of white defendants who were charged
with an attack on two African-Americans. The Court decided that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibited the criminal defendant from engag-
ing in racial discrimination by purposefully excluding jurors with the
use of peremptory challenges 2.5 Additionally, the Court commented that
although the peremptory challenge is not constitutionally mandated, it
still serves a vital role in the pursuit of justice.5 3 Essentially, the Court
did not stray from its general theme in Batson. Both Batson and McCol-
lum protected the litigant from purposeful discrimination in the imple-
mentation of peremptory challenges.
C. The Progeny of the Peremptory Challenge in Supreme
Court Doctrine
Batson has spawned a number of similar challenges to the use of
allegedly discriminatory peremptory strikes. In Powers v. Ohio,54 the
Court extended the protection from being discriminatorily excluded to
other races, and not simply the defendant's own race. Additionally, in
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,"1 the Court extended this protection to
protection from discriminatory strikes on the basis of gender. Batson
was further interpreted to extend to civil litigants in the case of Edmon-
son v. Leesville Concrete Co.56 Essentially, the Batson standard and its
protection of the peremptory challenge has survived, and indeed has
been extended to other courts. Yet Batson is perhaps most important in
the sense that it recognized the constitutional protections inherent in the
peremptory challenge.
D. Constitutional Implications of the Use of Peremptory Challenges
One interesting point regarding the argument over the continued
50. See infra Part llI.E.
51. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
52. Id. at 59.
53. Id. at 57.
54. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
55. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
56. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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plausible use of peremptories is whether they are even constitutionally
protected or mandated. In the absence of specific language providing
for peremptory challenges, they have been assumed not to be constitu-
tionally required.57 However, since Batson, the Court has recognized a
certain constitutional protection to jurors and litigants from the exercise
of discrimination in juror exclusion. Although not constitutionally man-
dated in the ordering of a fair trial by one's peers, peremptory challenges
are often heralded as essential to juror, litigant, and public rights.5 1 It is
the privilege of the peremptory challenge, which was being used uncon-
stitutionally in practice, that led the Batson Court to curb its abuse.59
Additionally, one could persuasively argue that the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of a right to trial by one's peers implicitly secures a
number of safeguards to protect that right. Peremptory challenges allow
the litigant to protect his or her claim or defense by allowing strikes of
those jurors believed to be inherently harmful to his or her case. The
importance of this safeguard cannot be overemphasized.
If the right is constitutionally guaranteed, then the current calls for
the abolition of the peremptory challenge may be premature, and in fact
violative of personal rights. The litigant's ability to protect his or her
own case, with limited effrontery directed toward the juror or the public,
may in fact serve a vital role in his or her own protection. Although
many have not regarded the litigant's right to protection as fundamen-
tal,6° the more cogent analysis requires an effort to protect the litigant's
use of the peremptory challenge. In that vain, the Batson Court
attempted to preserve litigants' right of challenge, while still maintaining
the juror's right to be free from unconstitutional exclusion from jury
service. The Court formulated a burden-shifting format when objecting
to a peremptory challenge on the grounds that it is purposely
discriminatory.
E. The Concept of "Burden-Shifting": What Are the "Steps"
Required to Ensure "Race-Neutrality"?
If one uses Batson as a guide in establishing a prima facie case of
57. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57; Batson, 476 U.S. at 91.
58. See Bader, supra note 10, at 583-85. Bader notes traditional lawyer arguments that cause
challenges do not accomplish the goal of eliminating bias, but peremptory challenges add to the
lawyer's innate "hunch" of bias that he or she would naturally prove on voir dire at some later
point. The author argues that this rationale is unpersuasive. Id.
59. See Rodger L. Hochman, Note, Abolishing the Peremptory Challenge: The Verdict of
Emerging Caselaw, 17 NoVA L. REv. 1367, 1373 (1993).
60. See Bader, supra note 10, at 594 ("The only governmental interest furthered by
discriminatory treatment of potential jurors... is an interest in affording litigants greater freedom
to use peremptory challenges. This interest is far from compelling .. ") (footnote omitted).
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discrimination, then one must follow the particular "steps" that the Court
articulates. The analysis appears simple in its explanation, but is mud-
dled in its application. Under the procedural posture illustrated in Bat-
son, when a defendant feels that the prosecutor has engaged in
intentional race discrimination in exercising peremptories, he or she can
object at that time. At that point, if the court has found a prima facie
case of discrimination, the burden "shifts" at this second step to the
prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral reason for the strike. Finally, at
the third "step" in the analysis, if the defendant can show the race-neu-
tral reason to be pretextual, or if the court discredits the reason, the Bat-
son standard has essentially been violated.
61
This method seems intuitive and simple. Yet questions still
abound, and continue to perplex judges and litigators. How can one
analyze whether the "reason" given by the attorney suffices as "race-
neutral"? The Court delineates and insists on the particular form of the
objection, by continually shifting the burden to the other party to either
prove or disprove discrimination. Yet the Court ostensibly fails to
account for the lawyer's capacity to easily circumvent the system and
continually utilize discriminatory practices. What prevents the savvy
attorney from articulating a race-neutral reason while secretly harboring
discriminatory intent? The Court in Purkett attempted to refine the Bat-
son analysis.
F. Current Pronouncement-Purkett v. Elem
In attempting to refine the "steps" articulated in Batson, the case of
Purkett v. Elem62 may have created even more confusion in the arena of
the peremptory challenge. The Court attempted to delineate the nature
of the race-neutral "reason" that need be given to combat a prima facie
case of purposeful race discrimination in the use of peremptory chal-
lenges. Once again, the Court chose to focus on the form of the attack
on the peremptory strike, and by so doing, lost sight of the real protec-
tions that the peremptory guarantees, while perhaps allowing for the
abuse of the peremptory challenge.63
61. The "steps" and their application can be found in Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-100.
62. 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995).
63. But see D. John Neese, Jr., Note, Purkett v. Elem: Resuscitating the Nondiscriminatory
Hunch, 33 Hous. L. REv. 1267, 1281 (1996). The author believes that Purkett in fact restores
integrity to the peremptory challenge by requiring a race-neutral explanation that does not deny
equal protection. Furthermore, he notes that since the court is now not required to sustain a
Batson objection to a challenge that is not discriminatory, and the burden of proof remains with
the opponent to the challenge, the challenger is sufficiently protected. He cites the example of a
weak man who objects to a large man serving on the venire simply because he feels
"uncomfortable with bodybuilders." Id. at 1281. This "reason" would apparently pass judicial
muster under the Purkett analysis.
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In Purkett, the Court was faced with the situation of a prosecutor
who wished to exclude prospective jurors because they had long,
unkempt hair, and because he did not like the way they looked, among
other things.' The Court determined that the ultimate burden of prov-
ing purposeful discrimination lies with the litigant opposing the striking
party.
65
The Court refined the Batson analysis, and proclaimed that at step
two, the striking party need only articulate a "race-neutral" reason for
the strike, one that need not be plausible or believable! 66 It is only at
step three, when the burden of ultimately proving purposeful discrimina-
tion must be carried by the opposing party, that the reason's "validity" is
truly implicated. The party opposing use of the peremptory strike must
now demonstrate that the "reason" given by the striking party is not to
be believed, in order to support its charge of purposeful discrimination.67
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had evaluated the "rea-
sonableness" of the proffered "reason" for the strike (a step three analy-
sis) at step two. Purkett held that the lower court should have
determined the reason's "genuineness" only at step two. Therefore, the
Supreme Court found the court of appeals' analysis to be in error,
reversing and remanding the case.68
Has Purkett advanced the high-minded status that Batson seemed to
envision for the use of the peremptory challenge, or has it actually deni-
grated peremptory challenges to the point where their abuse will become
rampant? Early analyses have indicated some differences on the issue.69
However, Justice Stevens' dissent seems to strike at the core of the prob-
lem-the Court has now given the savvy attorney clear guidelines in
what "reasons" to give to ensure that his or her peremptory challenge
will survive an attack based upon racial discrimination. This was surely
not the intent of Batson or Purkett, and illustrates a clear flaw in their
application.
64. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1770.
65. See id. at 1771.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1771-72.
69. See Joan E. Imbriani, Fourteenth Amendment, Section One-Equal Protection Clause-
Prosecution's Explanation for Exercising Peremptory Challenge Need Only Be Race-Neutral, Not
Persuasive or Plausible, Where Intentional Racial Discrimination Is Alleged-Purkett v. Elem,
115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995) (per curiam), 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 911, 915 (1996) (noting that
Purkett's standard is dubious, allowing a response to a Batson-based objection to be neither
logical nor related to the facts of the case), But see Neese, supra note 63, at 1281-82 (commenting
that the Court still protects the integrity of the peremptory challenge by examining the validity and
logic of the proffered reason at step three of the analysis; at that point, the trial judge determines
whether purposeful discrimination has been proven, and is likely to find pretext where it actually
exists).
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G. The Dissent in Purkett
First of all, Justice Stevens, in his dissent, remains true to precedent
in Batson. He requires that the reason articulated for the peremptory
strike be "race neutral, reasonably specific, and trial related. Nothing
less will serve to rebut the inference of race-based discrimination that
arises when the defendant has made out a prima facie case. That, in any
event, is what we decided in Batson.'"7" Justice Stevens addresses this
case on its facts, noting the silliness of the excuse proffered by the pros-
ecutor at step two of the Batson analysis.71 He confines his analysis to
the substance of the case while foregoing the form72 and theory of chal-
lenging a "reason" which is clearly pretextual.73
Justice Stevens captures the inherent flaws which Purkett impli-
cates. Although that case ostensibly protects the guarantee of the per-
emptory challenge, the insistence on the form of the challenge
necessitates needless inquiry and allows for abuse. Actually, Purkett
may have revitalized the peremptory strike to the point where it is inca-
pable of effective challenge on the basis of race discrimination.74 In
essence, Purkett does not further the rights of the juror, litigant, or pub-
lic from having prospective jurors protected from discrimination in the
exercise of peremptory challenges.75
IV. AN UNWORKABLE STANDARD IN PRACTICE? FLORIDA AS A CASE
STUDY
The State of Florida has attempted, much as the Supreme Court
has, to refine the burden-shifting analysis in opposing allegedly discrim-
70. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1774 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
71. See id. at 1775-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's unnecessary tolerance of silly,
fantastic, and implausible explanations ... demeans the importance of the values vindicated by
our decision in Batson.").
72. See id. at 1775 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[P]reoccupation with the niceties of a three-step
analysis should not foreclose meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial explanations that are
entirely unrelated to the case to be tried.").
73. In the case at bar, Justice Stevens noted that the "reason" the prosecutor proffered
concerning the way the jurors looked "may well be pretextual as a matter of law; it has nothing to
do with the case at hand, and it is just as evasive as 'I had a hunch."' Id.
74. See Richard C. Reuben, Excuses, Excuses: Any Old Facially Neutral Reason May Be
Enough to Defeat an Attack on a Peremptory Challenge, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 20 ("If the Court
won't look at the plausibility of a race-neutral strike, then it sounds to me like I have to prove
purposeful discrimination-what's in the prosecutor's mind. Unless you have a prosecutor who
messes up badly, you're never going to get that kind of proof.") (quoting Gary Guichard of
Atlanta, a state public defender).
75. "The Purkett bottom line?.., a legitimate reason must be given. But the reason does not
have to make sense." See An Explanation Is Necessary, but It Doesn't Have to Make Sense, 10
FED. LmrIGATOR 150 (1995).
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inatory peremptory strikes. In the 1984 case of State v. Neil,7 6 the Flor-
ida Supreme Court established a burden-shifting scheme for opposing
peremptory strikes which departed from U.S. Supreme Court doctrine77
as it then existed.78 In fact, the Neil court79 held that "[t]he Florida Con-
stitution's 8° guarantee of the right to an impartial jury prohibits racially
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges."8
The Florida Supreme Court had a chance to examine the issue
again in the case of State v. Slappy.82 There, the court applied the Bat-
son standard in determining the validity of the "reasons" proffered in
defense of a peremptory strike.83 Essentially, procedure dictated that the
judge sit in judgment over the "reasons" proffered, making his or her
analysis at the time when the reason was proffered.8"
However, the fundamental inquiries into the validity of the prof-
fered "reasons" changed in the 1990's, in part reflecting the current U.S.
Supreme Court doctrine. In State v. Johans,85 the Florida Supreme
Court regressed from its holding in Neil. The court there held that "from
this time forward a Neil inquiry is required when an objection is raised
that a peremptory challenge is being used in a racially discriminatory
manner."
86
76. 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
77. Actually, after Batson was handed down, its similarity to Neil was widely noted, in that
both cases attempted to arrive at fair juries and protection from impermissibly discriminatory
peremptory strikes. See Steven M. Goldstein, Constitutional Limitations on the Use of
Peremptory Challenges, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1993, at 75, 80.
78. The Florida Supreme Court instructed its lower courts to apply a different test than the
Supreme Court's in Swain. Essentially, the party opposing a strike would have to raise a timely
objection, and demonstrate that the challenged jurors are members of a distinct racial group, and
there is a strong likelihood that they were excluded solely on the basis of race. If the court finds
this to be the case, the initial striking party must show that the questioned challenges were not
solely exercised based on racial motivations. This is the second and last step-either the court
finds discrimination and dismisses the jury pool; or the party shows sufficiently to the court that
the challenges were trial-related or not solely race-related, and the inquiry ends. See Neil, 457 So.
2d at 486-87.
79. Id. at 481.
80. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
81. John W. Perloff, Note, State v. Neil: Approaching the Desired Balance Between
Peremptory Challenges and Racial Equality in Jury Selection, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 777, 778
(1985) (footnote omitted).
82. 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988).
83. Id. at 22. The court noted that the judge must weigh the proffered reason as he or she
would any disputed fact. The judge cannot merely accept the proffered reason at face value. The
judge must determine that the reasons are first, neutral and reasonable, and second, not pretext, in
accordance with Batson and Neil. Id.
84. Id. The reader will note that this analysis is quite similar to determining the reason's
validity at step two of the Batson analysis.
85. 613 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 1993).
86. Id. at 1321. Essentially, a Neil objection requires the striking party to articulate a race-
neutral reason for the peremptory challenge. The court retracted its holdings in Neil and its
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The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement attempted to
align its holding with that of Purkett. In so doing, the Florida Supreme
Court will likely cause the same confusion for courts and litigators in
determining race-neutrality and legitimacy in the exercise of peremptory
challenges as exists in U.S. Supreme Court doctrine. In Melbourne v.
State,8 7 the Florida Supreme Court held that a party opposing the use of
a peremptory must timely object, show that the potential juror is a mem-
ber of a distinct racial, ethnic, or gender group, and ask the court to have
the other party adduce a "reason" for the strike.88 At that point, the
Purkett analysis is essentially triggered.
As one can readily see, the Florida courts have struggled in deter-
mining which of the race-neutral "reasons" would suffice to survive an
attack on the use of allegedly discriminatory peremptory challenges. As
U.S. Supreme Court doctrine changes, so too does the state's law.
Although comity evidently plays a role in such a trend, the
unworkability of the Batson and Neil standards also inevitably led to the
change in Florida's legal doctrine. Even though, as at the federal level,
Florida state law still maintains the use of the peremptory challenge, its
application is muddled by formalistic tests to determine race-neutrality.
Melbourne, just as Purkett, cannot lend significantly more guidance to
trial judges who are still having trouble applying the Batson standard.
Even more troubling is that Florida is not alone in its difficulty in evalu-
ating the nondiscriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
V. UNWORKABILITY IN OTHER COURTS
A. Other States
Other states have encountered similar problems in handling the use
of peremptory challenges. Some states have considered suggestions to
amend their constitutions to employ a more rigidly defined burden-shift-
ing analysis in determining improper peremptory uses.89 Yet other state
progeny that would have required a showing of a strong likelihood of racial motivation for the
peremptory challenge. See id. at 1321.
87. 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996). Just as Johans receded from the holding in Neil, this case
recedes from the holding in Slappy. Melbourne requires that the proffered reason, just as in
Purkett, need only be "genuine," not "reasonable." See id. at 764.
88. See id. This is step one of the analysis. Steps two and three mirror Purkett's.
89. For example, New Mexico has amended its constitution in response to perceived harm
imposed by the Supreme Court. After Swain, it amended its constitution so that one could
establish improper use of peremptories either through the Swain framework or through the New
Mexico Constitution, where in Article II, Section 14, a defendant could show that the absolute
number of challenges in a case raised the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.
Additionally, and even more strikingly, the New Mexico Supreme Court noted in State v. Aragon,
784 P.2d 16 (1989), that the right to an impartial jury extends to the use of peremptory challenges.
See Pamela C. Childers, Note, Criminal Procedure-What Constitutes a Race-Neutral
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courts have added to current Supreme Court rationale by adding more
procedural "steps," or by requiring extra safeguards that the proffered
"reasons" for striking are non-racial.90 Certain state courts have found
themselves in a state of flux occasioned by the ongoing change in U.S.
Supreme Court doctrine.91 Finally, some state courts have taken lengths
to ensure race-neutrality while still allowing for the utilization of per-
emptory challenges.92
In essence, courts are guided by U.S. Supreme Court doctrine.
Nevertheless, in an effort to refine the analysis of burden-shifting in
proving purposeful discrimination, some states have added constitu-
tional protections for their citizens. In any regard, though, the current
state of peremptory challenges at the state level appears to be in a gen-
eral state of confusion.
Purkett will likely only add to that lack of guidance in evaluating
the validity of "race-neutral" reasons. If the only analysis at step two is
facial validity, will the skilled advocate not figure out the rules of the
game and find a way to articulate a race-neutral reason? Courts, jurors,
and litigants all have vested interests in the efficient use of nondiscrimi-
natory jury selection. The current doctrine, though, essentially allows
non-racial "hunches" when excusing jurors.
Here lies the ultimate paradox-both Batson and Purkett seem to
insist on the continued use of the peremptory without perceptions of bias
based in discrimination; yet both Courts ostensibly allow other non-gen-
Explanation for Using Peremptory Challenges? State v. Guzman and Purkett v. Elem, 26 N.M. L.
REv. 555, 562-63 (1996).
90. For instance, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, after Batson, seemed to do more to
ensure race-neutrality than was federally demanded. In State v. Grandy, 411 S.E.2d 207, 208
(S.C. 1991), the South Carolina Supreme Court added a further requirement to Batson's demand
for race-neutrality by making the reasons for striking a juror be case-related, clear and reasonably
specific, and legitimate. Grandy insisted that the reasons rest on a reasonable basis, and not on
mere assertion or speculation. See C. Shawn Dryer, Courts Examine Use of Peremptory
Challenges, 47 S.C. L. REv. 111, 115 (1995).
91. In Alabama, the case of J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) has some
authors worried that the peremptory challenge has reached its demise. One author notes, much as
the author of this Note, that the current state of the peremptory challenge is not fixed. It is neither
one "for cause," yet it does require explanation by the litigant or defendant. See Lisa Lee Mancini
Harden, Note, The End of the Peremptory Challenge? The Implications of J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B. for Jury Selection in Alabama, 47 ALA. L. REv. 243, 267 (1995) (noting the possible
demise of the peremptory challenge in Alabama).
92. New York is one of the most innovative states in this regard. Not only has the state added
constitutional protections against discriminatory uses of peremptories in its Equal Protection and
Civil Rights clauses, but it has extended those protections beyond merely race, into both race and
gender combined. Furthermore, the state has even recently formed the "Jury Project," a group
organized to streamline the number of peremptory challenges so that they would be most
efficiently and effectively used in criminal litigation. See James A. Domini & Eric Sheridan,
Note, Batson Challenges and the Jury Project: Is New York Ready to Eliminate Discrimination
from Criminal Jury Selection? 11 ST. Joint's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 169, 182-87 (1995).
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uine reasons for excusal from service. This policy in practice does not
protect the integrity of the judiciary, and mocks the true heart of the
Court's intent in theory-to protect the judicial system and jurors from
arbitrary, illegal excusals from jury service.
B. Civil Courts
The Supreme Court extended the analysis used in Batson to the
civil arena, in Edmonson.93 Logically, since the roots for the peremp-
tory challenge are based on protection for jurors, parties, and the pub-
lic, 94 there exists no immediate reason why their nondiscriminatory use
should not be implemented at the civil level. The Court has now effec-
tively raised the status of civil litigants' rights to those of criminal
defendants in selecting juries.95 This can only serve to bolster civil liti-
gants' assurances in a fair system of trial by an impartial jury.96
Furthermore, the rights implicated in civil trials, specifically with
regard to damages, 97 can significantly elevate juror and litigant interest
in seating a fair jury. Racial motivations can unfortunately factor into
decisionmaking in civil trials, just as in criminal trials. Consequently,
the elimination of racial bias in the civil arena can only serve to bolster
judicial integrity and public morale in the civil court system.
Hence, in the civil arena as in the criminal, there exists a mecha-
nism for the elimination of potential jurors without substantive cause.
However, the race-neutral safeguards in achieving successful strikes
may lead to wasteful inquiries into pretext, facial validity, and the neu-
trality of "reasons." Such questions mask the true intent of the peremp-
tory challenge-to exclude a juror based on any reason, in order to both
ensure partiality and eliminate bias, while still maintaining the right to
control the makeup of a jury pool absent purposeful discrimination.
93. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
94. Interestingly, these parties' tangible or psychological interests in maintaining
peremptories are often adverse. "[A] conflict exists between the litigant's interest in the
unfettered exercise of peremptory challenges and the juror's right to be free of discrimination in
the jury selection process." Bader, supra note 10, at 572.
95. See Michael Dennis Rawls Stevens, Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Race
Based Peremptory Challenge Exclusions No Longer Permitted in Civil Trials, 62 Miss. L.J. 209,
226 (1992).
96. Id.
97. Bader notes that "[in civil disputes, jurors have the power to decide crucial questions,
such as allocation and degree of fault and the nature and amount of any compensatory or punitive
damage awards." Bader, supra note 10, at 572 (footnote omitted). It would then obviously follow
that "[t]o the citizens who are afforded an opportunity to render a judgment on these weighty
matters, and to the litigants whose interests will then be affected, jury selection methodology is
significant." Id.
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C. Criminal Courts
Most of the discussion thus far, and most caselaw on peremptory
challenges, deal with criminal suits, where a defendant or prosecutor
wishes to remove potential jurors. In the criminal arena, it is logical that
the litigants have a great deal at stake in eliminating potential, actual, or
perceived bias. Therefore, the application or potential abuse of a per-
emptory strike must be examined carefully in deciding when to overturn
a case for the grant or denial of a peremptory challenge.98
In the criminal arena, the peremptory challenge is closely tied to the
constitutional right to receive a trial by a jury of one's peers, and hence,
the use of the peremptory challenge is vital to most litigants' rights.
Even if not constitutionally mandated, peremptories are powerful tools.
They allow for perceived, psychological, or even capricious chal-
lenges,99 and their availability in part protects the litigant's due process
rights in facilitating fair trials.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE USE OF THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE
A. Abolition-Civil and Criminal
The current state of the peremptory challenge is in question. Many
scholars since the Batson decision have signaled its demise and called
for its abolition."° Justice Marshall even gave lip service to this notion
in his concurring opinion in Batson.01 Certainly, this elimination would
cut down on the great expense of jury profiling and research, 102 and
98. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently ruled that the improper
denial of a peremptory challenge was to be afforded the remedy of automatic reversal. See
Stephanie Hinz, En Banc 9th Circuit Reaffirms Automatic Reversal Standard for Wrongfully
Denied Peremptory Challenges, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 27, 1996, at 10242 (citing U.S. v.
Annigoni, 1996 WL 536490 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1996)). She further cites Circuit Judge Hawkins,
writing for the majority, explaining that "peremptory challenges still serve the important purpose
of enabling litigants to strike jurors who appear biased or hostile." Id.
99. See Hochberg, supra note 13, at 10 (citing 4 Wu.LtAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs 353
(15th ed. 1809) for the proposition that at common law, the peremptory challenge was
"unexplained, arbitrary, and capricious .... ).
100. For instance, in a May 9, 1996 ruling, Judge Constance Baker Motley, a U.S. District
Court Judge, barred the use of peremptory challenges in her civil courtroom. The judge added
that the Batson standard appears to be unworkable in practice, and the permissibility of
peremptory challenges is a cause of "great consternation" in the courts. See Mark Hansen,
Peremptory-Free Zone: A Judge Won't Allow Such Challenges in Her Courtroom, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1996, at 26.
101. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall noted that the
Court's protection against race discrimination could really end up being an imaginary protection,
as other makeshift non-racial reasons proffered might be accepted by the Court in making a strike.
See id.
102. One example of the increased use of jury questioning and profiling is illustrated by a
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would generally eliminate the seemingly arbitrary removal of jurors
from service.
Yet elimination of the peremptory challenge would impinge on
juror, litigant, and public rights. In reality, peremptories are likely on
the rise, since Purkett has allowed for the mere articulation of a facially
neutral reason at step two of the Batson analysis. Therefore, a different
alternative to abolition would likely better serve the interests of the indi-
vidual, the community, and judicial integrity.
B. Retention
Viewed most favorably, Batson curbs the abuse of the peremptory
challenge by forbidding racial discrimination in its application. Addi-
tionally, the opinion allows for the use of peremptories, and even
encourages their use in a nondiscriminatory fashion.1"3 There is much
support today for the notion that peremptory challenges serve a vital and
protective role in the judicial process."
Perhaps the arguments against the current use of the peremptory
challenge merely focus on the form of the objection. After all, Batson
only outlaws racial discrimination in its application, and allows for all
other uses. Hence, an attorney may still strike for any reason, and may
vigorously question the potential juror in an effort to disqualify him or
her for cause. Conversely, the litigator may pursue an unsuccessful
cause challenge against a potential juror, and fall back on the peremp-
tory as a means of last resort in attacking the juror.
The Batson Court seemingly provides a valid basis for the retention
of the peremptory challenge in its current form. Yet by its mere insis-
tence on a non-racial "reason" for the strike, the Batson and Purkett
Courts have struck at the very "unfettered" nature of the peremptory
strike. Therefore, a more innovative alternative is required in order to
restore integrity to the juror, the litigant, and the judicial system as a
whole.
Sacramento multiple-murder trial judge having potential jurors fill out a 108-question survey. See
Philip Hager, Selective Service: Get Rid of Peremptory Challenges to Guarantee Impartial Juries,
CAL. LAW., Aug. 1995, at 33.
103. The objective reader will note that perhaps "savvy" attorneys represent each party in a
litigation. Hence, perhaps Batson really accomplishes what it sets out to do-retain peremptories
while eliminating invidious discrimination. After all, "if skilled lawyers are representing both
sides the jury composition should be fairly balanced." Kathy Barrett Carter, Lawyers, Judges Mull
Top Court's Ruling on Race, Gender Jury Challenges, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), May
21, 1995 (quoting jury consultant John Lamberth of Temple University).
104. One will note that on today's Court, Justice Antonin Scalia is an ardent supporter of this
age-old "right." See Smith & Ochoa, supra note 23, at 185.
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C. Modification into "Quasi-Cause" Challenges and Limiting the
Number of Uses
As a merely objective exercise, one cannot truly say that the current
state of exercising peremptory challenges has elevated their use to chal-
lenges "for cause." After all, the proponent of the strike need not articu-
late the actual bias of the juror. However, one also cannot truly say that
the peremptory is one which may be exercised at will, arbitrarily and
without reason. Batson and Purkett require the articulation of race-neu-
tral reasons for the use of peremptories, to combat a charge of pur-
poseful discrimination.
Is there a middle ground? One could argue that the Court has
already articulated a semi- or quasi-cause rationale supporting a new use
of the peremptory challenge. 10 5 Essentially, by viewing the litigant, in a
civil or criminal setting, as a state actor, his or her racially invalid per-
emptory strike could be challenged. °6 Consequently, no peremptory
challenge would be truly free from a challenge for lack of non-racial
"'cause."
However, I would argue for a new "quasi-cause" proposal which
takes into account the desire for race-neutrality, as well as the unfettered
use of peremptories. Such a method could take the form of expanded
cause challenges to include factors such as race. Attorneys could inquire
at length on voir dire into jurors' backgrounds. This would be accom-
plished solely in an effort to determine whether their racial status would
prevent them from making fair and honest decisions in the case, or from
conforming with the rule of law propounded by the judge.
By expanding the arena which may be pursued for cause, the judge
could then allow each party a certain number of limited peremptories.
This would protect the litigant and the attorney from seating jurors with
perceived non-racial bias. Additionally, any issues of race which were
case-related would have been addressed during the voir dire and chal-
lenged for cause, and dealt with at that stage of the inquiry. This would
allow the litigant to avoid any implications of race-based challenges.
The litigant's right to formulate a jury of his or her peers cannot be
overlooked. If a juror has articulated opinions which do not rise to the
level of cause challenges, but still indicate some bias, the peremptory
should remain a viable option. The cause challenge would eliminate
racially discriminatory removals, and the few peremptories available
105. See generally Bill K. Felty, Note, Resting in Mid-Air, the Supreme Court Strikes the
Traditional Peremptory Challenge and Creates a New Creature, the Challenge for Semi-Cause:
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, 27 TULSA L.J. 203 (1991) (arguing that the Court has
created a semi-cause challenge).
106. Id. at 203.
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could eliminate any jurors who were still felt to be undesirable. The
optimum result is that jurors would not feel stricken for racial reasons,
and those who vocalized potential bias or disfavor with a litigant would
be removed peremptorily. The juror, litigant, and court would be served
well by such a system.
Alternatively, courts may prefer to set up a mini-trial when a juror
is stricken for perceived racial reasons. This could be pursued as a mini-
cause challenge, wherein the juror would have some rights in fighting to
stay on a jury panel. Perhaps if the juror felt racial discrimination was at
play, the juror could expound to the court the reasons why he or she
would not be affected by race. If one leaves this option in the hands of
the juror, and not as an automatic judicial inquiry, the ends of justice
would be better served. Attorneys could then pursue peremptory chal-
lenges in their true form, as arbitrary tools to protect litigants. Only
when challenged by a juror as to race-based discrimination would the
Batson-type inquiry be triggered.
Even at that point, the court could transform such a colloquy with
the potential juror as a "quasi-cause" inquiry, since the juror would
essentially be arguing the merits of how he or she is not racially biased.
Since the peremptory, in its definitional form, is a capricious and arbi-
trary tool, its original integrity could be preserved. Once again, the juror
in this method would have elevated rights, and the litigants and the court
could still maintain the unfettered yet limited use of peremptory
challenges.
Proponents of either plan must take into account the fact that cer-
tain questions concerning the juror's background factor into their deci-
sionmaking status. 107 By limiting the number of challenges, opponents
of the peremptory challenge would also be protected. The judicial sys-
tem as a whole would benefit from using the peremptory challenge in
conformity with the reasons for its use-juror, litigant, and judicial
protection.
The peremptory challenge is a hybrid. Essentially, viewing the
questioning of a potential juror as one for "quasi-cause" would allow for
the vital questions concerning race to be asked, without affecting the
juror's individual liberties. If the search for juries is to find "fair"
panels, and courts are no longer willing to accept peremptories for any
old "hunch," then a limited number of "semi-cause" challenges appears
to be a fairly reasonable alternative to the current methods being
employed.
107. Bader notes that under this view, the fact that a juror does not have a completely neutral
background would undermine the fairness of a verdict in which he or she participates. See Bader,
supra note 10, at 586.
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D. Other Methods to Ensure Race-Neutrality While Protecting Juror
and Litigant Rights
The Supreme Court has obviously vacillated on the issue of
whether racial discrimination is to be accorded serious investigation.
10 8
Assuming, though, that the Court's focus is truly based upon the protec-
tion against discrimination, there must be a great number of alternatives
to the current use of peremptories which would still ensure race-neutral-
ity. Some scholars have argued for affirmative peremptory juror selec-
tion.'1 9 Yet others have insisted that racially diverse juries are naturally
more "impartial,"' 1 0 and hence should be idealized.
There are a host of other methods to eliminate discrimination while
maintaining judicial integrity. Scholars have argued for the elimination
of peremptories for the prosecution only; for providing counsel to those
challenged as to their ability to serve; and even for instituting monetary
fines for the improper use of peremptory challenges.' Although any
number of methods would require their own implementation, the guide-




The use of the peremptory challenge has its basis in the rich
Supreme Court doctrine on the subject. However, as is evident from
Swain to Batson to Purkett, the Court has struggled with exactly how to
use peremptories while not impinging upon the rights of the individual
juror or litigant, and also the public as a whole. As a consequence,
Supreme Court doctrine has focused on the "form" of the challenge and
its particular steps to ensure race-neutrality.
Furthermore, especially after Purkett, the Court has advanced the
108. See Muller, supra note 33, at 96, and accompanying text.
109. See generally Hans Zeisel, Comment, Affirmative Peremptory Juror Selection, 39 STAN'.
L. REv. 1165 (1987) (detailing an experiment as to whether lawyers indeed challenge the "right"
jurors, those which would have voted in opposition to their interests).
110. Therefore, one should strive to achieve a racially diverse panel almost as a measure of
affirmative action. Color-conscious juries would not stigmatize one group or enforce stereotypes;
would not imply that unqualified people had been given special treatment; nor injure the public.
In essence, the color-conscious jury is more representative of the public interest. See Albert W.
Alschuler, Equal Justice: Would Color-Conscious Jury Selection Help? Yes: A Racially Diverse
Jury Is More Likely to Do Justice, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 36, 36.
111. See Hochman, supra note 59, at 1402.
112. In fact, the Second District Court in California rejected Purkett's acceptance of "silly" or
"implausible" reasons to be acceptable at the second step of a Batson hearing. The court held that
"body language" alone could not suffice as a race-neutral reason to support a peremptory
challenge. See Stephanie Stone, California Appeal Court Says Juror's "Lack of Eye Contact"
Insufficient Explanation for Peremptory Challenge, WEST's LEGAL NEws, Mar. 19, 1996, at 1413
(discussing People v. Jamison).
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peremptory challenge to the point where it is nearly impossible to prove
racial discrimination, contrary to its intent. Now state and federal
courts, both civil and criminal, are faced with the dilemma of how to use
peremptories, if at all. States are adding protections to ensure that per-
emptories are exercised without regard to race.
Nevertheless, the ability of the litigant to control the makeup of the
jury cannot be lightly discarded. As the right to a jury trial by one's
peers is constitutionally mandated, the use of peremptory challenges
may indeed serve as a facet of those broad rights. Hence, courts should
attempt to find other means to combat the current transformation of the
peremptory challenge.
Since the peremptory challenge cannot pass judicial muster unless
it is race-neutral, why not create quasi-cause challenges which are case-
related and tied to the underlying facts of the case? This way, litigators
can explore the views of particular jurors in a non-racial fashion.
In any event, the current state of the peremptory challenge is in
serious jeopardy following Purkett. That case has unwittingly returned
the judicial system to its pre-Batson roots, where mere "hunches" are
allowed to remove potential jurors. Paradoxically, though, race-con-
scious decisions to strike are not allowed by Purkett. Justice Stevens
eloquently noted in Purkett that the hunches and racial reasons are often
intertwined or even the same. Since the Court has evinced a clear intent
to revive the peremptory challenge, while still maintaining race-neutral-
ity, the Court should adduce a better method of so doing. Otherwise, the
savvy attorney at step two of Purkett will always find a race-neutral
reason to survive an attack of purposeful discrimination, and will enjoy
the unfettered use of peremptories. This result neither furthers the
Court's intent, nor protects the intended beneficiaries of the peremptory
challenge-the juror, the litigant, and the public. The time has come for
a change.
JASON LAESER
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